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Every spring, the federal government appears to deliver an abun-
dance of announcements that describe criminal convictions and civil in-
junctions involving taxpayers who have been accused of committing tax 
fraud. Commentators have occasionally suggested that the government 
announces a large number of tax enforcement actions in close prox-
imity to a critical date in the tax compliance landscape: April 15, “Tax 
Day.” These claims previously were merely speculative, as they lacked 
any empirical support. This article fills the empirical void by seeking to 
answer a straightforward question: When does the government publi-
cize tax enforcement? To conduct our study, we analyzed all 782 press 
releases issued by the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division during 
the seven-year period of 2003 through 2009 in which the agency an-
nounced a civil or criminal tax enforcement action against a specific 
taxpayer identified by name. Our principal finding is that, during those 
years, the government issued a disproportionately large number of tax 
enforcement press releases during the weeks immediately prior to Tax 
Day compared to the rest of the year and that this difference is highly 
statistically significant. A convincing explanation for this finding is that 
 
 * Associate Professor of the Practice of Tax Law and Faculty Director of the 
Graduate Tax Program, New York University School of Law. 
 ** Associate Professor, Management and Global Business Department, Rutgers 
Business School – Newark and New Brunswick. 
We would like to thank Ilan Benshalom, Tom Brennan, Len Burman, Bryan 
Camp, Brian Galle, David Gamage, Ajai Gaur, Anna Gelpern, Rachelle Holmes, 
David Cay Johnston, John Leubsdorf, Helen Liang, Sarah Lawsky, Leandra Leder-
man, Benjamin Leff, Leigh Osofsky, Ruth Mason, Susie Morse, Fred Schauer, Deb-
orah Schenk, Lee Sheppard, Bryan Skarlatos, Dennis Ventry, Jr., Robert Weinberger, 
Larry Zelenak and participants in the 2009 Junior Tax Scholars Conference, the 2010 
Critical Tax Conference and the 2010 Law & Society Annual Meeting for thoughtful 
suggestions and criticism. We are grateful to Christopher Porter for valuable research 
assistance. All errors are our own. 
BLANK.FORMATTED.4.DOC 8/30/2010  11:58 AM 
2 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  30:1 
government officials deliberately use tax enforcement publicity to influ-
ence individual taxpayers’ perceptions and knowledge of audit prob-
ability, tax penalties, and the government’s tax enforcement efficacy 
while taxpayers are preparing their annual individual tax returns. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As winter’s ice finally thaws, the first signs of spring appear: daf-
fodils bloom, baby chicks hatch, and tax evaders go to prison. Every 
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February, March, and April, the government appears to deliver an 
abundance of announcements regarding criminal convictions and civil 
injunctions involving taxpayers accused of committing tax fraud. The 
subject of a typical government press release at this time of year may 
be a promoter of notorious tax schemes like Irwin Schiff, who was in-
dicted on March 23, 2004, for advising nearly 5,000 clients to file “zero 
return tax returns.”1 Or the subject may be a taxpayer who utilized a 
third party’s tax evasion services, such as Robert Moran, a UBS client 
who pleaded guilty on April 14, 2009, to hiding $3 million of assets in 
a secret Swiss bank account.2 Sometimes the press release even de-
scribes a celebrity taxpayer like Joe Francis, creator of the “Girls 
Gone Wild” DVDs, who was indicted on April 11, 2007, on tax eva-
sion charges for deducting more than $20 million in phony business 
expenses.3 To the naked eye, these types of government announce-
ments seem to occur in close proximity to a critical date in the tax 
compliance landscape: April 15, “Tax Day.”4 
Commentators have occasionally suggested that the government 
initiates and announces a disproportionately large number of tax en-
forcement actions around Tax Day. They have intimated, for example, 
that the government “seems to save some juicy fraud convictions for 
late March”5 and “actively seeks to gain media attention on successful 
prosecutions, particularly around April 15.”6 Despite their provocative 
implications, however, these claims lack empirical support in the exist-
ing tax compliance literature. To date, no scholar has investigated 
whether the government actually does announce more tax enforce-
ment actions in the weeks immediately prior to Tax Day than it does 
during the rest of the year and whether a statistically significant pat-
tern of publicity indeed exists. 
 
 1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Irwin Schiff and Two Associates Indicted 
for Tax Fraud (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv04182.htm. 
 2 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, UBS Client Pleads Guilty to Filing False 
Tax Return Hid Assets Worth $3 Million in Secret Swiss Bank Account (Apr. 14, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv09344.htm. 
 3 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Creator of Girls Gone Wild Indicted for 
Tax Evasion (Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv07237.htm. 
 4 See I.R.C. § 6072(a) (setting forth April 15 as due date for most individual tax 
returns). Throughout this article, we use the term “Tax Day” to refer to April 15 or 
the last day on which taxpayers may file an annual individual tax return without being 
subject to a late filing or late payment penalty. 
 5 John S. Carroll, A Cognitive-Process Analysis of Taxpayer Compliance, in 2 
TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 228, 244 (Jeffrey A. Roth & John T. Scholz eds., 1989). 
 6 Susan B. Long & Judyth A. Swingen, Taxpayer Compliance: Setting New 
Agendas for Research, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 637, 637 n.1 (1991). 
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This article fills the empirical void by seeking the answer to a 
straightforward question: when does the government publicize tax en-
forcement? 
To conduct our study, we collected all press releases issued by the 
Internal Revenue Service (Service) and the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice Tax Division from 2003 to 2009 that announced a civil or criminal 
tax enforcement action against any taxpayer that the agency identified 
by name.7 We found that the Service issued a negligible number of 
press releases — only a handful or two per year — of this nature. The 
U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division, by contrast, issued many 
press releases of this nature during the seven-year test period. Our 
sample thus consisted of 782 such press releases issued by the U.S. 
Department of Justice Tax Division from January 1, 2003, through 
December 31, 2009. We calculated the average number of these tax 
enforcement press releases issued during the following three time 
windows:8 (a) February 1 to Tax Day; (b) March 1 to Tax Day; and (c) 
April 1 to Tax Day. We then compared the frequency of press releases 
in our sample issued during each of these pre-Tax Day time windows 
to the frequency of those issued during the rest of the year. 
Our study demonstrates that from 2003 through 2009, the U.S. 
Department of Justice Tax Division issued a disproportionately large 
number of tax enforcement press releases per week during each of the 
three windows described above compared to the rest of the year. Spe-
cifically, we found that on an average weekly basis the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice Tax Division issued: (a) 58% more tax enforcement 
press releases from February 1 through Tax Day than it issued during 
the rest of the year; (b) 71% more tax enforcement press releases 
from March 1 through Tax Day than it issued during the rest of the 
year; and (c) 128% more tax enforcement press releases from April 1 
through Tax Day than it issued during the rest of the year.9 Negative 
binomial regression analysis revealed that each of these differences is 
highly statistically significant.10 Put differently, it is extremely unlikely 
that this pattern is random. 
Why does the government issue so many press releases during the 
weeks immediately prior to Tax Day? A convincing explanation is 
that government officials are manipulating the timing of tax enforce-
ment press releases in an effort to influence taxpayers’ perceptions 
 
 7 See infra Part III.A for a discussion of the methodology for our study. 
 8 See infra Part III.A for a discussion of why we tested these three windows. 
 9 See infra Part III.B for further discussion. 
 10 See infra Part III.B for further discussion. 
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and knowledge of audit probability, tax penalties, and the govern-
ment’s tax enforcement efficacy at a time when they are in the process 
of preparing their annual individual tax returns.11 The government 
may issue tax enforcement press releases in the weeks prior to Tax 
Day in an attempt to cause some taxpayers to conclude that the prob-
ability of an audit and the severity of a penalty for tax noncompliance 
are greater than they are in reality. In addition, because the govern-
ment prevails in the vast majority of the cases described in its press re-
leases issued prior to Tax Day, it may choose to publicize these tax en-
forcement efforts to cause compliant taxpayers to conclude that the 
government effectively detects and prosecutes tax evaders to a greater 
extent than it actually does. 
Our study raises several important questions for future research. 
First, as a normative matter, should the government engage in this 
type of publicity strategy? Next, how does the timing of the govern-
ment’s tax enforcement publicity affect individual taxpayers’ tax filing 
behavior? Last, what are the potential risks inherent in the govern-
ment’s apparent publicity strategy? 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: Part II provides 
a brief overview of the discussion in the literature of how tax en-
forcement publicity relates to tax compliance. Part III presents the 
methodology and findings of our study of when the government publi-
cizes tax enforcement. Part IV describes questions for future research. 
Part V concludes. 
II.  TAX COMPLIANCE AND TAX ENFORCEMENT PUBLICITY 
A.  Publicity and Perceptions 
Commentators have often debated the impact of publicity sur-
rounding criminal tax prosecutions and civil tax settlements on indi-
vidual tax compliance.12 While they do not concur completely on 
 
 11 See infra Part III.C for further discussion. 
 12 For a representative sampling of this discussion, see Leandra Lederman, The 
Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 
1493 (2003) (“Another relevant data point with the respect to the impact of enforce-
ment is the effect on voluntary compliance of criminal convictions for tax evasion, 
which the IRS publicizes.”); Robert Mason, A Communication Model of Taxpayer 
Honesty, 9 LAW & POL’Y 246, 256 (1987) (commenting that “fear of sanctions” im-
pacts compliance and that “those with low fear levels admit they evade their taxpay-
ing responsibilities”); Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 
U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1076 (2003) (“One way in which publicity surrounding the 
IRS’s enforcement efforts can affect tax compliance is by influencing taxpayers’ be-
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whether the effect is positive or negative, most commentators agree 
that this type of publicity may have some influence on individuals’ 
willingness to comply with the tax system. 
The literature contains several different justifications for the view 
that public reports of tax enforcement against specific taxpayers may 
encourage individuals to calculate their tax liabilities correctly and to 
file their tax returns on time. Some commentators have contended 
that publicity of successful tax enforcement actions may cause indi-
vidual taxpayers to perceive that the “government is vigilant in col-
lecting tax revenues”13 and, as a result, “people greatly overestimate 
the probability of an IRS audit.”14 Similarly, others, such as Leandra 
Lederman, have asserted that frequent imposition of prison sentences 
in publicized tax enforcement actions may cause taxpayers to develop 
a fear of tax penalties and that the “fear of sanctions increases tax 
compliance.”15 And some commentators have concluded that when 
the government publicizes its criminal and civil tax enforcement ef-
forts, it “promote[s] confidence in tax administration, which under-
girds voluntary compliance.”16 
In contrast to the case for tax enforcement publicity as a means of 
preserving tax compliance, some commentators believe that public re-
                                                                                                                                       
liefs about the possibility of detection and punishment.”); Robert M. Melia, Is the Pen 
Mightier Than the Audit?, 34 TAX NOTES 1309, 1309 (Mar. 30, 1987) (“[A] good com-
munications strategy amplifies enforcement activities and any other actions a revenue 
department might take to improve voluntary compliance, as well as being an effective 
tool in its own right.”); Susan Cleary Morse, Using Salience and Influence to Narrow 
the Tax Gap, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 483, 507 (2009) (“Attention to salience and influ-
ence in communications might also improve audit publicity . . . .”); Alex Raskolnikov, 
Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 689, 708 (2009) (“Publicizing tax prosecutions, highlighting new and larger pen-
alties, and trumpeting increased audit rates informs the public that the government is 
vigilant in collecting tax revenues.”); Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: 
Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 
199 (1996); Liezel Walker, The Deterrent Value of Imposing Prison Sentences for Tax 
Crimes, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 29 (2000) (“Communica-
tion of the threat of detection, prosecution, and punishment is a more arduous task 
than is initially perceived, but if successfully conveyed to average citizens and poten-
tial offenders, the deterrent value will presumably increase compliance with tax laws, 
reduce the tax gap, and ensure the non-likelihood of future tax crimes.”). 
 13 Raskolnikov, supra note 12, at 708. 
 14 James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax Compliance, 36 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 818, 844 (1998). 
 15 Lederman, supra note 12, at 1489. 
 16 Leandra Lederman & Stephen W. Mazza, Addressing Imperfections in the Tax 
System: Procedural or Substantive Reform?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1423, 1441 (2005). 
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ports of tax enforcement may weaken tax morale.17 The principal justi-
fication for this view is that by revealing that some taxpayers have en-
gaged in abusive tax behavior, the government may cause individuals 
to believe that other taxpayers are probably engaged in the same ac-
tivities, but they have not yet been detected.18 As a result, proponents 
of this theory believe that individual taxpayers who hear reports of tax 
fraud cases may develop “a reciprocal motive to evade,”19 leading to a 
decrease in overall tax compliance. 
There are several responses to this latter account. First, at least 
one study of voluntary compliance in the United States found a corre-
lation between the number of criminal tax convictions and individual 
tax compliance.20 Another study has found that prosecution of crimi-
nal tax cases and the resulting publicity “has a highly significant im-
pact on income reporting.”21 Second, as Leandra Lederman has noted, 
there is a distinction between public reports about the “tax gap,” 
which is the difference between the amount of tax that taxpayers 
should pay and the amount that is paid voluntarily and on time, and 
criminal tax prosecutions of specific taxpayers.22 News about the tax 
gap may cause some taxpayers to conclude that cheating is wide-
spread, whereas reports of criminal convictions in tax fraud cases indi-
cate that the government has been successful in detecting and punish-
 
 17 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action 
and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 72 (2003). 
 18 See id. at 83; see also Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 199 (theorizing that “when 
we hear about Leona Helmsley evading taxes and going to jail, some of us say to our-
selves ‘we had better pay our taxes,’ but many others tend to engage in an internal 
dialogue that sounds more like ‘this rich woman evaded her taxes; from what I hear, 
most other rich people do, and probably I should or I’ll be losing out.’”). 
 19 Kahan, supra note 17, at 83. 
 20 Alan H. Plumley, The Impact of the IRS on Voluntary Tax Compliance: Pre-
liminary Empirical Results, NAT’L TAX ASS’N 95TH ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N NOV. 12–14, 
2002, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/irsvtc.pdf. 
 21 Alan H. Plumley, The Determinants of Individual Income Tax Compliance: 
Estimating the Impacts of Tax Policy, Enforcement, and IRS Responsiveness, I.R.S. 
Pub. No. 1916, 36 (Nov. 1996), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/ 
pub1916b.pdf. 
 22 See Lederman, supra note 12, at 1494 (“[P]ublicity about specific individuals 
does not seem to have the same negative effects as publicizing the ‘tax gap,’ which 
may imply to taxpayers that cheating is rampant.”). The study on which Kahan relies 
is described in Steven M. Sheffrin & Robert K. Triest, Can Brute Deterrence Back-
fire?, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 193, 211–14 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (demonstrat-
ing that taxpayers who read reports regarding the “tax gap” were less likely to comply 
with the tax system). 
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ing abuse.23 
B.  Sources of Information 
Individuals develop beliefs about the government’s tax enforce-
ment capabilities as a result of information they receive from a variety 
of sources. Some of the most prominent sources are described below, 
along with an analysis of their likely impact on individual tax compli-
ance. 
1. Government 
The government is a major source of information that may influ-
ence an individual taxpayer’s compliance decisions. As discussed 
above, the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division regularly issues 
press releases describing civil injunctions and criminal indictments is-
sued against taxpayers who have engaged in tax fraud.24 The fact that 
these press releases “name names” may further enhance their impact 
on taxpayers, making the negative consequences of noncompliance 
seem more vivid and real. The Service also issues statements that may 
affect tax compliance, such as announcing it is prepared to challenge 
any taxpayers who participate in any of its list of “dirty dozen” tax 
scams, which includes schemes involving hiding income offshore and 
filing false claims for refunds.25 At least one study has demonstrated 
that this type of visible tax enforcement information has a highly sig-
nificant and positive effect on individual taxpayers’ reporting of in-
come.26 
2. Media 
The media is a source of tax enforcement information that often 
complements the government’s efforts. The media regularly parrots 
language in U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division press releases 
when describing criminal indictments or convictions.27 One tax com-
 
 23 See Lederman, supra note 12, at 1494. 
 24 See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. 
 25 Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., Beware of IRS’ 2009 “Dirty Dozen” 
Tax Scams (Apr. 13, 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/ 
0,,id=206370,00.html. 
 26 See Plumley, supra note 21, at 36. 
 27 For example, consider the nearly identical language in Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice Tax Div., Creator of Girls Gone Wild Indicted for Tax Evasion (Apr. 
11, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv07237.htm, and Amy Bonawitz, 
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pliance study has found that individual taxpayers who learn about the 
government’s tax enforcement actions through the media are less 
likely to cheat than when they hear about them from friends or fam-
ily.28 One explanation offered for this result is that “the media tends to 
focus on cases where taxpayers go to prison or pay large fines.”29 An-
other study has found that criminal tax enforcement has significant 
general deterrence effects and that “the media plays a large role in 
fostering tax compliance.”30 
3. Personal Experience 
Some individuals learn about the government’s tax enforcement 
efforts as a result of personal experience with an audit. At least one 
study has found that personal experience with an audit has a positive 
impact on an individual taxpayer’s compliance.31 While this type of 
experience may deliver tax enforcement information in a way that en-
courages future tax compliance, very few individual taxpayers experi-
ence audits. In 2009, only 1.03% of all individual tax returns were sub-
ject to a field or correspondence audit.32 
4. Friends and Family 
Another source of tax enforcement information for many indi-
                                                                                                                                       
“Girls Gone Wild” Founder Indicted, CBSNews.com, Apr. 11, 2007, at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/04/11/entertainment/main2673413.shtml. 
 28 See, e.g., Melia, supra note 12. 
 29 See id. at 1311, n.3. 
 30 Jeffrey A. Dubin, Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer 
Noncompliance, 35 PUB. FIN. REV. 500, 502 (2007). Without the government’s initia-
tion of a public proceeding, such as a trial, the media would have great difficulty in 
reporting on the government’s tax enforcement actions against specific taxpayers. The 
reason for this result is that the government is generally prohibited by federal tax-
payer privacy rules from releasing tax return information, including enforcement ac-
tions, regarding any particular taxpayer. I.R.C. § 6103(a). When the government pub-
licly pursues a criminal or civil action against a particular taxpayer, some courts have 
held that the government may issue a press release that contains information from the 
public record. See, e.g., Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 337 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(press release does not violate privacy rules “once tax return information is made a 
part of the public domain”) (citing Thomas v. United States, 671 F. Supp. 15, 16 
(E.D.Wisc. 1987)); Thomas v. United .States, 890 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 31 See Plumley, supra note 20, at 8. 
 32 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FISCAL YEAR 2009 ENFORCEMENT AND 
SERVICE RESULTS (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/ 
fy_2009_enforcement_results.pdf [hereinafter ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE 
RESULTS]. 
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viduals is friends and family. Individuals may learn about the audit 
process through a dinner conversation with a neighbor or coworker 
who has recently been audited. At least one study has found that this 
type of informal transfer of information has a negative impact on indi-
vidual tax compliance and that “taxpayers who hear about IRS audit 
activities via word of mouth are more likely to evade [taxes] than are 
taxpayers who do not hear about audits in this fashion.”33 One expla-
nation offered for this result is that when friends and family members 
discuss audits, the individual who has been audited may brag about 
dubious items on the individual’s tax return that the Service agent 
failed to detect, rather than the items that the agent challenged.34 
As this discussion shows, the sources of tax enforcement informa-
tion that may have the most significant positive effect on an individual 
taxpayer’s willingness to comply with the tax system are the govern-
ment itself and the media. 
C.  Timing Suspicions 
In light of the potential effects of tax enforcement information, 
commentators have occasionally theorized that the government re-
leases a disproportionate amount of this information in the weeks 
immediately prior to Tax Day. For example, Susan Long and Judyth 
Swingen have commented that the “IRS chooses cases to prosecute in 
part because of their publicity value and actively seeks to gain media 
attention on successful prosecutions, particularly around April 15, to 
enhance any deterrent effects.”35 Others have taken this suggestion a 
step further by considering the government’s intentions. As Andrew 
Carroll has written: 
[A] well-publicized conviction for tax fraud should make the 
perceived likelihood of punishment temporarily increase, and 
the same event can be made more salient with pictures and 
emphasis on connections to taxpayers living in the same city 
or having other similarities to the convicted person; the IRS 
seems to save some juicy fraud convictions for late March. . .36 
 
 33 Melia, supra note 12, at 1311, n.3. 
 34 See id.; see also, Lederman, supra note 12, at 1495. 
 35 Long & Swingen, supra note 6, at 637, n.1. 
 36 Carroll, supra note 5, at 24; see also Frederick Schauer & Richard Zeckhauser, 
Paltering, in DECEPTION: FROM ANCIENT EMPIRES TO INTERNET DATING 38, 44 
(Brooke Harrington ed., 2009) (“The Internal Revenue Service appears deliberately 
to initiate tax fraud criminal prosecutions and to send out routine press releases about 
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Without explicitly saying so, Carroll implies that the government at-
tempts to mislead individual taxpayers into compliance right before 
Tax Day by creating unrealistic impressions of the likelihood of an 
audit or tax penalty. 
III.  THE TIMING OF TAX ENFORCEMENT PUBLICITY 
Despite their rhetorical power, the statements described above 
regarding the government’s timing of tax enforcement publicity37 have 
never been substantiated by empirical analysis. Even though it may 
appear that the government issues press releases that report criminal 
and civil tax enforcement actions in the weeks prior to April 15, the 
existing tax compliance literature does not address whether the gov-
ernment actually issues more press releases during those weeks than 
during the rest of the year, and certainly does not explain whether the 
supposed increase in press releases is of any statistical significance. 
In this Part, we resolve the question of when the government pub-
licizes tax enforcement. We begin by describing the methodology for 
our study of the government’s tax enforcement publicity; we then pre-
sent our principal findings; and, finally, we offer several possible ex-
planations. 
A.  Methodology 
To conduct our study, we collected all press releases issued by the 
Service and the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division from 2003 
through 2009 in which either agency announced a criminal or civil tax 
enforcement action against any taxpayer that the agency identified by 
name. We limited our search to press releases in which the govern-
ment named names, as these press releases contain precisely the type 
of visible image of tax enforcement that commentators have refer-
enced in the tax compliance literature.38 The sources of the press re-
leases were databases on each agency’s publicly available Web site.39 
These press releases first became regularly available on each agency’s 
Web site starting in 2002,40 so we compiled our data set starting with 
                                                                                                                                       
audits in the weeks immediately preceding April 15 . . .”). 
 37 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 38 For examples, see supra notes 13–18 and 24–26 and accompanying text. 
 39 Service database of press releases, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/ 
0,,id=108500,00.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). U.S. Dep’t of Justice Tax Div. data-
base of press releases, http://www.justice.gov/tax/taxpress2010.htm (last visited Feb. 
10, 2010). 
 40 See supra note 38. 
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press releases issued on January 1, 2003. We gathered all press re-
leases issued on this date through December 31, 2009. 
We found that the Service issued a negligible number of press re-
leases that named names, whereas the U.S. Department of Justice Tax 
Division issued many press releases of this nature. For example, the 
Service issued an average of less than eight press releases satisfying 
our criteria per year during the test period.41 The U.S. Department of 
Justice Tax Division, by contrast, issued an average of more than 110 
press releases satisfying our criteria per year during the test period.42 
The lack of Service press releases makes sense in retrospect, given 
that the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division — and not the Ser-
vice — is responsible for pursuing criminal and civil tax litigation. To 
avoid biasing our sample, we focused our analysis on tax enforcement 
press releases issued by the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division, 
which are available on the Tax Division’s publicly accessible Web 
site.43 
Our sample, therefore, consisted of 782 press releases issued by 
the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division during the seven-year 
period of 2003 through 2009.44 About one-third (34%) of the press re-
leases in our sample involved criminal tax enforcement actions, such 
as reports of individuals pleading guilty to charges of criminal tax eva-
sion or receiving prison sentences for engaging in this activity. The 
remaining 66% of the press releases in our sample involved civil tax 
enforcement actions, such as a court’s issuance of a civil injunction en-
joining a particular individual to cease from advising taxpayers to 
claim tax positions the government considered fraudulent. 
For each day that was not a Saturday, Sunday, or federal holiday 
from January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2009, we counted the 
number of tax enforcement press releases in our sample that were is-
sued on that workday. (We excluded weekends and federal holidays 
because government offices are officially closed for business on those 
days.45) The number of press releases issued on a single workday 
 
 41 See IRS News Release and Fact Sheet Archive, available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
newsroom/article/0,,id=108500,00.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 42 See U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division, Tax Division Press Releases, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/taxpress2010.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). 
 43 See id. 
 44 The total number of U.S Department of Justice Tax Division press releases 
issued between Jan. 1, 2003 and Dec. 31, 2009 was 797. Thus, only fifteen of these 
press releases were excluded from our sample because they did not involve criminal 
or civil tax enforcement actions against specifically identified taxpayers. 
 45 For the list of federal holidays during which the U.S. Department of Justice 
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ranged from a low of zero to a high of four during the 1,754 workdays 
in our sample. For ease of interpretation, we report our results on an 
average weekly basis, even though our statistical tests used a day-by-
day analysis.46 
After compiling the data set, we compared the frequency of press 
releases in our sample issued during a particular time window leading 
up to Tax Day to the frequency of press releases during the rest of the 
year. We defined “Tax Day” as April 15 or the last day on which tax-
payers could file an annual individual tax return without being subject 
to a late filing or late payment penalty, such as April 16 if April 15 fell 
on a Sunday.47 We performed our analysis for three different time 
windows: (a) February 1 to Tax Day; (b) March 1 to Tax Day; and (c) 
April 1 to Tax Day. We selected the time window of February 1 to 
Tax Day for two reasons. First, third-party institutions, such as em-
ployers and banks, are required to mail many types of information re-
turns, such as Form W-2 or Form 1099-INT, to the Service and to in-
dividual taxpayers by January 31 of each year.48 Since individual 
taxpayers must include these information returns with their annual in-
dividual income tax returns, most individual taxpayers cannot file 
their annual individual income tax returns until at least February 1 
each year.49 Second, the vast majority of annual individual income tax 
returns are filed with the Service between February 1 and Tax Day 
each year.50 In 2008, for example, nearly 80% of all annual individual 
income tax returns were filed during this period.51 To confirm the ro-
                                                                                                                                       
was closed during the years in our sample, see U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 
2010 Federal Holidays, http://www.opm.gov/Operating_Status_Schedules/fedhol/ 
2010.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2010). The U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division is-
sued only one out of 782 press releases on one of those days (Sunday, July 12, 2009). 
For purposes of our analysis, we treated that particular press release as having been 
issued on the following Monday (July 13, 2009). 
 46 Based on the concept of a five-day workweek, we computed the weekly aver-
ages by taking the daily averages and multiplying them by five. 
 47 See I.R.C. § 7503 (providing special rules for years when April 15 falls on a 
Saturday, Sunday, or federal holiday). 
 48 See IRS, General Instructions for Forms W-2 and W-3, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/instructions/iw2w3/ch01.html (last visited May 14, 2010) (stating 
that employers must furnish Form W-2 to employees by January 31). 
 49 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, IRS Modernization: Continued Progress 
Necessary for Improving Service to Taxpayers and Ensuring Compliance, May 20, 
2003, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03796t.pdf. 
 50 See IRS Filing Season Weekly Reports, available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
taxstats/article/0,,id=184855,00.html (last visited February 10, 2010). 
 51 Id. According to the Service, 78.77% of all individual annual tax returns were 
filed between February 1, 2008 and April 15, 2008. 
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bustness of our study’s findings, we also analyzed two alternative 
specifications for this time window, March 1 to Tax Day and April 1 
to Tax Day. 
The primary objective of our study was to determine whether 
there was a statistically significant difference between the frequencies 
of tax enforcement press releases issued during each time window and 
the frequency during the rest of the year. In other words, if a pattern 
emerged, we wanted to test whether the pattern was due to random 
chance. Because our data are “count data”52 — i.e., the number of 
press releases issued each workday — they are not normally distrib-
uted — i.e., they do not result in a bell-shaped curve.53 As a result, a 
simple statistical test such as the t-test would not have been an appro-
priate statistical technique.54 We determined that for this type of data 
the appropriate statistical test is negative binomial regression. We 
analyzed the data in our sample using the software program Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).55 For every negative binomial 
regression analysis, the software computed a likelihood ratio chi-
square (df = 1) and an associated p-value, which is an indicator of sta-
tistical significance.56 The p-value reveals the likelihood that a differ-
ence occurred by random chance.57 
 
 52 Count data refers to data describing the number of times an event (in this 
case, a press release) occurs during a given time interval (in this case, each workday). 
 53 In many situations, randomness means that a set of numbers is distributed in 
the familiar, symmetrical, bell-shaped curve, where the average — exactly in the mid-
dle — is the most commonly occurring number, and the farther away the other num-
bers are from the average, the less likely they are to occur. For example, adult female 
height follows this pattern, which is called a normal distribution. Randomly occurring 
count data, however, do not follow this pattern. Instead, they follow what is called a 
negative binomial distribution, which typically means a lot of instances when an event 
did not happen, some instances when an event happened once, fewer instances when 
it happened twice, fewer still when it happened three times, and so on. This is the pat-
tern that occurred in our sample. For example, for the February 1 to Tax Day period, 
55.9% of workdays had no press release, 30.0% had one, 10.1% had two, 3.5% had 
three, and 0.5% had four. This is a classic negative binomial distribution. 
 54 Many statistical tests, such as the t-test, rely on the assumption that a sample 
is normally distributed. Since this statistical assumption is clearly violated for our 
sample, see supra note 53, more sophisticated statistical tests are required. Negative 
binomial regression is the appropriate technique for analyzing data that follow a 
negative binomial distribution, as in our sample. 
 55 Specifically, we used Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for 
Windows, version 17 (2008). 
 56 See ROXY PECK, CHRIS OLSEN & JAY DEVORE, INTRODUCTION TO STATISTICS 
& DATA ANALYSIS 576 (2d. ed. 2008). 
 57 See id. 
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B.  Findings 
We found the following regarding the frequency of press releases 
in our sample issued during a particular time window leading up to 
Tax Day, versus during the rest of the year: 
1. February 1 to Tax Day 
For the largest of the three time widows we studied, February 1 to 
Tax Day, we found that the government issued 58% more tax en-
forcement press releases per week than during the rest of the year. 
Specifically, the government issued an average of 3.1 press releases 
per week during the February 1 to Tax Day window, compared to an 
average of only 2.0 press releases per week during the rest of the 
year.58 This finding confirms the suspicion that the government issues 
more press releases describing criminal and civil tax enforcement 
against specific taxpayers in the weeks leading up to Tax Day than it 
does at other times of the year.59 
This difference is highly statistically significant.60 The negative 
binomial regression model’s likelihood ratio chi-square is 21.69, with a 
p-value of only .0000032. This is equivalent to stating that there is a 
one in 311,656 chance that this difference in the government’s issu-
ance of tax enforcement press releases is due to random occurrence. 
2. March 1 to Tax Day 
When we changed the time window to March 1 to Tax Day, we 
found an even greater difference between the frequency of press re-
leases issued during the time window and the rest of the year. In other 
words, when we narrowed the time window to approximately six 
weeks before Tax Day, the pattern of a disproportionate issuance of 
 
 58 Some percentages in this article may appear off by a few percentage points 
due to rounding error, since we only report press releases per week to the nearest 
tenth. For example, the +58% figure is based on 3.147 press releases per week 
(rounded to 3.1 in our reporting) during the February 1 to Tax Day window, com-
pared to 1.986 press releases per week (rounded to 2.0) during the rest of the year. 
 59 See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text. 
 60 Statistical significance indicates that something is unlikely to have occurred by 
random chance. The standard cut-off for statistical significance is a p-value of less 
than .05, which means that the probability of something occurring by random chance 
is less than 5%, i.e., less than a one-in-twenty chance. In our sample, the p-value is 
dramatically lower than this standard cut-off; hence, it is extremely unlikely that the 
pattern we observe is due to random chance. 
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tax enforcement press releases grew even stronger. 
For the March 1 to Tax Day time window, the government issued 
71% more tax enforcement press releases per week during the time 
window than during the rest of the year. Specifically, the government 
issued an average of 3.5 press releases per week during the March 1 to 
Tax Day window, compared to an average of only 2.0 press releases 
per week during the rest of the year. 
Again, this difference is highly statistically significant. The nega-
tive binomial regression model’s likelihood ratio chi-square is 21.82, 
with a p-value of only .0000030. This is equivalent to stating that there 
is a one-in-333,427 chance that this difference in the government’s is-
suance of tax enforcement press releases is due to random occurrence. 
3. April 1 to Tax Day 
When we changed the time window to April 1 to Tax Day, we 
found a dramatic increase in the difference between the frequency of 
press releases issued during the time window and the frequency dur-
ing the rest of the year. 
For the April 1 to Tax Day time window, we found that the gov-
ernment issued 128% more tax enforcement press releases per week 
during the time window than during the rest of the year. Specifically, 
the government issued an average of 4.8 press releases per week dur-
ing the April 1 to Tax Day window compared to an average of only 2.1 
press releases per week during the rest of the year. Put differently, our 
results show that during the two-week period immediately prior to 
Tax Day, the government issued more than double the number of tax 
enforcement press releases per week than it did during the rest of the 
year. 
This difference is highly statistically significant. The negative bi-
nomial regression model’s likelihood ratio chi-square is 23.48, with a 
p-value of only .0000013. This is equivalent to stating that there is a 
one in 791,637 chance that this difference in the government’s issu-
ance of tax enforcement press releases is due to random occurrence. 
As our findings indicate, during the seven-year period of 2003 
through 2009, the government issued a disproportionately large num-
ber of tax enforcement press releases on a weekly basis during each of 
the three windows described above, compared to the rest of the year. 
In each case, we determined that the difference is highly statistically 
significant. 
The table below summarizes the frequency of the government’s 
issuance of tax enforcement press releases during each of the three 
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windows we studied, versus the rest of the year, along with the magni-
tude of this difference and its statistical significance: 
TABLE 1.  COMPARISON OF TAX ENFORCEMENT PRESS RELEASES 
ISSUED IN TIME WINDOWS VS. REST OF YEAR (2003–2009) 
 AVERAGE NUMBER OF 
PRESS RELEASES PER WEEK 
PROBABILITY THAT 


























2.1 4.8 +128% .0000013 791,637 
The chart below provides a graphic illustration of the average fre-
quency of tax enforcement press releases issued throughout the year 
during 2003 through 2009. The chart reveals a striking increase in the 
frequency of press releases issued during the two weeks prior to Tax 
Day. We designated April 1 to Tax Day (usually April 15) as early 
April, and the day after Tax Day until April 30 as late April. For all 
other months, we divided the number of workdays in that month in 
half; if a month had an odd number of workdays, we made the early 
part of that month one day longer than the late part. For each half-
month, we aggregated across the seven years of the sample to calcu-
late the number of press releases per workday in that half-month. 
Based on the concept of a five-day workweek, we then multiplied this 
per-workday number by five to compute the average number of press 
releases per week, as shown in the figure below. 
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Last, we performed the same analysis described above, but lim-
ited our sample of press releases to only those press releases that in-
volved criminal tax enforcement actions, such as indictments or prison 
sentences. We found that the timing of the government’s issuance of 
criminal tax enforcement press releases revealed the same pattern as 
what we observed when we performed our analysis for all press re-
leases in our sample.61 As a result, we have reported the overall results 
for all press releases in our sample. 
4. Individual Years 
We found that the pattern described above occurred throughout 
the seven years that we studied. To illustrate this observation, the ta-
ble below presents the difference between the average number of tax 
enforcement press releases issued per week during the April 1 to Tax 
Day window and the number issued per week during the rest of the 
 
 61 In other words, when we segregated the press releases that described criminal 
tax enforcement actions, we observed a striking and statistically significant increase in 
the frequency of these press releases issued during each of the three time windows 
prior to Tax Day, versus the rest of the year. 
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year for each of the years in the 2003 through 2009 period. 
TABLE 2.  COMPARISON OF TAX ENFORCEMENT PRESS RELEASES 
ISSUED IN APRIL 1 TO TAX DAY WINDOW VERSUS REST OF YEAR 
(2003–2009) 
 AVERAGE NUMBER OF PRESS RELEASES PER WEEK 
YEAR REST OF YEAR 
APRIL 1ST TO 
TAX DAY 
% MORE 
2003 1.3 5.5 +336% 
2004 2.1 5.9 +175% 
2005 2.3 5.5 +140% 
2006 2.0 2.7 +37% 
2007 1.8 4.2 +132% 
2008 2.2 4.1 +83% 
2009 3.1 5.9 +92% 
OVERALL 2.1 4.8 +128% 
As this table illustrates, the pattern that we have observed was 
consistent from year to year. With respect to the April 1 to Tax Day 
time window, it appears that in the later years of our study the dispar-
ity lessened.62 However, the government still issued nearly twice the 
number of tax enforcement press releases per week (+92%) during 
the April 1 to Tax Day time window during 2009, for instance, than it 
issued during the rest of the year. Thus, the magnitude of this differ-
ence has remained large. 
C.  Discussion 
As our findings reveal, it is highly unlikely that the tax enforce-
ment publicity patterns that we observed were the result of random 
chance. This section considers possible reasons that the government 
has issued such a disproportionately large number of press releases in 
the weeks leading up to Tax Day compared to the rest of the year. 
Below we examine three possible motivations for the timing pat-
terns that we observed: (a) certain criminal tax procedure rules; (b) 
the government’s effort to deter tax noncompliance; and (c) the gov-
ernment’s effort to bolster confidence in compliant taxpayers. We be-
lieve that the first possibility, that the surge in publicity is due to 
criminal tax procedure rules, is the weakest of the three explanations. 
The second and third possibilities, that the government uses tax en-
 
 62 For example, the difference in 2003 was +336% and in 2009 it was +92%. 
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forcement publicity to achieve deterrence and confidence effects, are 
in our view, much stronger explanations. 
1. Criminal Tax Procedure 
It is possible that the surge in tax enforcement press releases that 
occurs prior to Tax Day is not strategic, but merely an artifact of a 
procedural aspect of the criminal tax law. This theory, however, is an 
unconvincing explanation for the results of our study. 
For many tax crimes, the statute of limitations on prosecution is 
six years from the later of the last act of tax fraud or the statutory due 
date of the taxpayer’s tax return (without extension).63 In other words, 
if a taxpayer commits criminal tax fraud prior to April 15, then the 
statute of limitations runs for six years starting from April 15 of the 
year in which the taxpayer committed tax fraud and ending six years 
later on April 15.64 The same rule applies in cases where a taxpayer 
who has committed criminal tax fraud has filed no tax return at all.65 
Either way, the government must indict a taxpayer accused of tax 
fraud by the expiration of the statute of limitations, which may be 
April 15. 
It is possible, consequently, that the government issues so many 
press releases describing tax enforcement actions prior to April 15 be-
cause of the statute of limitations on criminal tax fraud. Since some 
criminal tax fraud cases are no longer viable after April 15 as a proce-
dural matter, perhaps criminal prosecutors seek many indictments 
during this time of year. If this assumption is correct, then perhaps 
criminal tax procedure plays a role in the timing of the government’s 
tax enforcement publicity. 
This explanation, however, should be rejected for several reasons. 
First, of the press releases in our data set that were issued be-
tween February 1 and Tax Day during 2003 through 2009, less than 
10% involved criminal indictments for tax fraud.66 More than 90% of 
 
 63 I.R.C. § 6531(a). Congress enacted the statute of limitations for criminal tax 
fraud cases in order to encourage the government to pursue criminal charges without 
delay and to prevent taxpayers from having to defend themselves against criminal 
charges stemming from very old events. See Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 
114 (1970). 
 64 I.R.C. § 6531(a). 
 65 United States v. Williams, 928 F.2d 145, 149 (5th Cir. 1991); see also United 
States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 66 Out of the 231 tax enforcement press releases issued by the U.S. Department 
of Justice Tax Division between February 1 and Tax Day during 2003 through 2009, 
BLANK.FORMATTED.4.DOC 8/30/2010  11:58 AM 
2010] When Is Tax Enforcement Publicized? 21 
the press releases that the government issued during this period in-
volved non-indictment actions, such as convictions, sentencings, guilty 
pleas, civil injunctions, settlements, and general descriptions of suc-
cessful prosecutions. 
Second, some of the high-profile indictments that the government 
announced in the weeks prior to Tax Day do not appear to involve 
statute-of-limitations issues. For example, in the case of Joe Francis, 
creator of the Girls Gone Wild DVDs, and Irwin Schiff, founder of 
the “We The People Foundation,” the government appears to have 
had time left in the statute of limitations for tax fraud when it ob-
tained criminal indictments.67 
Last, even though the statute of limitations may expire on April 
15 in some cases, prosecutors can obtain extensions during which they 
can seek indictments. If a prosecutor files a complaint with a U.S. 
magistrate within the period of the statute of limitations and certain 
other conditions are present, then the prosecutor may receive up to 
nine additional months in which to seek an indictment for tax fraud.68 
This exception debunks the theory that criminal prosecutors must 
seek an indictment right before April 15 in cases where the taxpayer 
filed a tax return early or did not file a tax return at all. As a result, 
the statute of limitations on criminal tax fraud is unlikely to be the 
motivating force behind the timing of the government’s issuance of 
tax enforcement press releases. 
2. Deterrence 
A much more convincing explanation for the timing patterns that 
we observed is that, by announcing criminal tax convictions and civil 
tax injunctions at a time when most taxpayers (80%) are in the proc-
ess of preparing their annual individual tax returns,69 government offi-
cials are attempting to deter taxpayers who might otherwise be in-
clined to participate in tax avoidance or evasion schemes. 
Government officials have indicated that they view tax enforce-
                                                                                                                                       
only twenty-three of them involved criminal indictments for tax fraud. 
 67 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Creator of Girls Gone Wild Indicted 
for Tax Evasion (Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/ 
txdv07237.htm; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Irwin Schiff and Two As-
sociates Indicted for Tax Fraud (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
tax/txdv04182.htm. 
 68 I.R.C. § 6531(a). For other instances in which the statute of limitations on 
criminal prosecutions for tax fraud may be suspended, see I.R.C. § 7609(e) (statute of 
limitations suspended during third-party summons proceeding). 
 69 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
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ment press releases as key means of deterrence, even though they 
have not explicitly acknowledged a timing strategy. For example, in 
2001, Mark Matthews, then-Chief of the Service’s Criminal Investiga-
tion Division, commented that the Service and the Department of Jus-
tice Tax Division were in the process of developing a new Web site to 
“generate multiple press stories nationwide about particular cases and 
to target enforcement efforts to particular media outlets or other spe-
cialized websites that reach key audiences.”70 In describing the pur-
pose of the initiative, Matthews stated, “We have to reach over 200 
million Americans who encounter the tax system each year . . . to de-
ter the potential cheaters”71 and support the “general deterrence mis-
sion”72 of the Criminal Investigation Division. Several years later, Ei-
leen O’Connor, then the Assistant Attorney General of the U.S. 
Department of Justice Tax Division, testified before the U.S. Senate 
Finance Committee regarding the very press releases that we analyzed 
in our study, commenting: 
In our view, justice must not only be done, it must be seen to 
be done. . . . Our website publicizes our enforcement actions, 
and our cases have garnered substantial favorable press cov-
erage in major local and national media outlets over the past 
five years. We continue to improve our website to ensure that 
those who might otherwise be tempted by the latest tax scam 
will easily be able to find information about our law-
enforcement efforts against scam promoters and partici-
pants.73 
O’Connor’s underlying message was that by using real examples of tax 
enforcement efforts, the government would deter individual taxpayers 
from engaging in “the latest tax scam.”74 Under O’Connor’s leader-
ship, the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division frequently issued 
press releases every April that contained language nearly identical to 
 
 70 Mark E. Matthews, New IRS Publicity Strategy, 49 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 15, 15 
(2001). Matthews further commented that his agency would use the Web site in the 
following manner: “[E]very time we get a new conviction in a particular program, we 
steer the reporters to the relevant webpage. We tell the reporter, ‘Here’s a press re-
lease on a conviction regarding an abusive trust.’” Id. at 17. 
 71 Id. at 16. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Tax Division, Corporate and Partnership Enforcement Issues: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 21 (2006) (statement of Eileen J. O’Connor, 
Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) (emphasis added). 
 74 Id. 
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that quoted above.75 In addition, other officials from the Service and 
U.S Department of Justice Tax Division have made similar state-
ments.76 
A reaction to the deterrence explanation may be one of skepti-
cism. Each year, the government releases detailed statistics describing 
the percentages of tax returns audited, tax cases litigated, and tax 
revenue collected.77 Why would government officials believe that tax 
enforcement press releases would have a different impact on general 
deterrence, given the quantity of publicly available tax enforcement 
data that is already available to taxpayers? 
As behavioral researchers have shown, individuals often rely on 
cognitive biases — i.e., mental short cuts — when deciding whether to 
pursue various activities,78 including paying their taxes.79 Behavioral 
researchers have also demonstrated that outside actors can manipu-
late the decision-making processes of individuals by exploiting their 
reliance on these biases.80 By presenting individual taxpayers with 
 
 75 For example, compare the language in the following two press releases: Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Notes Increase in Tax Enforce-
ment (Apr. 6, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv05167.htm and Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and IRS Highlight Tax Enforce-
ment Efforts (Apr. 11, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv06212.htm. 
 76 See, e.g., Jeremiah Coder, Conversations: Eileen Mayer, 116 TAX NOTES 738, 
740 (Aug. 27, 2007) (quoting then-Chief of the Service’s Criminal Investigation Divi-
sion as stating that “[o]ur efforts have shown that focused and direct contact with the 
local reporters does make an impact on media coverage of our compliance and en-
forcement efforts”); Kristen A. Parillo, Korb: Tax Press Plays Crucial Role in IRS 
Communications Strategy, 118 TAX NOTES 478, 478 (Jan. 28, 2008) (quoting the Ser-
vice’s then-Chief Counsel Donald Korb as commenting, “The tax press is really an 
important part of our business in a way that it wasn’t, and what I’ve tried to do is take 
advantage of that in terms of tax administration. . . . It’s a very effective way for us to 
get our message out and get our spin on things.”). 
 77 The Service provides detailed information regarding its tax enforcement prac-
tices to the public — without any references to specific taxpayers — on an annual ba-
sis. See, e.g., 2008 IRS Data Book, available at http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/ 
0,,id=205182,00.html. News and research organizations also seek tax enforcement data 
from the Service by filing requests under the Freedom of Information Act. 5 U.S.C. § 
552 (2006). 
 78 See AMOS TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, Judgement Under Uncertainty: 
Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 35, 35 (Terry Connolly, 
Hal R. Arkes & Kenneth R. Hammond eds., 1982). 
 79 See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 
1862 (1994); See also Edward J. McCaffery and Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases 
in Thinking about Tax, in Proceedings of the 96th Annual Conference on Taxation 
434–43 (2003). 
 80 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The 
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vivid images of tax enforcement involving real people, government of-
ficials may anticipate that they can affect beliefs of individuals that 
may influence their decision to comply with the tax system. Some of 
these beliefs include the following: 
Beliefs About Tax Audits. The government’s tax enforcement 
press releases may cause some individual taxpayers to overestimate 
the chance of being audited. 
Individuals who are faced with uncertainty frequently make 
judgments based on accessible images or experiences, even though 
these examples may be rare exceptions to the usual occurrence.81 As a 
result of the “availability” heuristic, individuals often draw conclu-
sions regarding the probability that future events will occur by recall-
ing highly memorable, and thus available, past events.82 When indi-
viduals read in the newspaper that a fatal shark attack has occurred, 
they may avoid summer trips to the beach, even though the likelihood 
that they will be subject to a shark attack is extremely low.83 Further, 
third parties can take advantage of the availability heuristic by strate-
gically revealing certain memorable information to an intended audi-
ence.84 As Jon Hanson and Douglas Kysar have written, for example, 
cigarette manufacturers regularly exploit the availability heuristic of 
individual smokers by “inundat[ing] public spaces with healthful im-
ages of smoking.”85 
Government officials may use their carefully timed press releases 
to attempt to manipulate the availability heuristic of individual tax-
payers who might otherwise be inclined to participate in a tax-
                                                                                                                                       
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 630 (1999); Jon D. Hanson 
& Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A Response to Market Manipu-
lation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 259, 262 (2000); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. 
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 
HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1422 (1999); see also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 6 (2008). 
 81 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging 
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973). 
 82 See id.; see also TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN, supra note 78, at 11 (“[A] class 
whose instances are easily retrieved will appear more numerous than a class of equal 
frequency whose instances are less retrievable.”). 
 83 See TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN, supra note 78, at 14. 
 84 See supra note 80. 
 85 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 80, at 1516 (“It seems plausible that the availabil-
ity heuristic has played a role in lowering smokers’ estimates of personal risks of ciga-
rettes, given that smokers are rarely, at least in their day-to-day use of the product, 
injured by smoking; the diseases caused by smoking (unlike, say, the harms caused by 
tornadoes, homicides, and airplane accidents) are not often depicted in the media or 
covered by the news.”). 
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avoidance or evasion strategy. By presenting individual taxpayers with 
vivid examples in which the Service has detected tax fraud — whether 
it involves a popular celebrity’s phony business deductions,86 a high-
profile banker’s offshore bank account,87 or a local tire salesman’s un-
derreporting of gross income88 — the government may provide an in-
dividual taxpayer with available images that showcase the Service’s 
detection capabilities. Because the government consistently provides 
more of these images to individual taxpayers during the weeks leading 
up to Tax Day than it does during other times of the year, individual 
taxpayers may draw upon these available images as they teeter on the 
decision to claim questionable tax positions on their annual individual 
tax returns, such as a fraudulent request for a refund or an inflated 
charitable contribution deduction. In reality, a rational individual tax-
payer should recognize that the chance that the Service will detect and 
challenge a claim of an illegitimate tax position is very low.89 
Beliefs About Tax Penalties. Publicity regarding criminal tax en-
forcement just before Tax Day may also cause some taxpayers to 
overestimate the severity of tax penalties. 
Individuals often become mentally wedded to initial images and 
values as a result of a cognitive bias known as “anchoring.”90 As a re-
sult, even though individuals may eventually encounter new or con-
flicting data, they may find it difficult to detach themselves from an 
initial impression.91 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have fa-
mously demonstrated that car salespeople take advantage of anchor-
ing by placing a price sticker on the windshield of a used car.92 A po-
 
 86 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Creator of Girls Gone Wild Indicted for 
Tax Evasion (Apr. 11, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv07237.htm. 
 87 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, UBS Client Pleads Guilty to Filing False 
Tax Return Hid Assets Worth $3 Million in Secret Swiss Bank Account (Apr. 14, 
2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv09344.htm. 
 88 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Owner of Alabama Tire Store Sentenced 
to Prison for Tax Evasion (Oct. 10, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/ 
txdv091069.htm. 
 89 The audit rate for individual taxpayers in 2009 was 1.03%. ENFORCEMENT 
AND SERVICE RESULTS, supra note 31. However, for income subject to information 
reporting, taxpayers may believe the chance of Service detection of abuse to be much 
higher than this figure. See Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed 
IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. 971, 974 (2003). For further discussion of taxpayer beliefs re-
garding audit probability, see Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s 
Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2009). 
 90 Hanson & Kysar, supra note 80, at 1440. 
 91 See id. 
 92 See id. 
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tential consumer will often become anchored to that initial selling 
price and will begin negotiations with the salesperson by attempting to 
negotiate the price down from the original anchor.93 As Kysar and 
Hanson have noted, “[a]lmost everyone knows that the eventual sale 
price will be less than the sticker price, but the dealer nonetheless 
gains an advantage from setting the initial price.”94 
The government’s use of tax enforcement press releases may take 
advantage of individual taxpayers’ anchoring biases, in addition to 
their availability heuristics. Images of taxpayers receiving lengthy 
prison sentences as a result of claiming fraudulent tax positions may 
cause some taxpayers to become anchored to the concept of prison as 
a penalty for tax noncompliance. Even though the number of in-
stances in which taxpayers receive prison sentences as a result of tax 
offenses is infinitesimally small, reports of five-year prison sentences 
for tax evasion that appear in the mainstream media prior to Tax Day 
(fueled, in large part, by the government’s press releases) may cause 
some taxpayers to assume that the tax penalties for a range of forms 
of tax noncompliance are much higher than they actually are. The 
government appears to exploit this confusion by frequently including 
statements in its tax enforcement press releases such as “[p]eople who 
willfully fail to meet their tax obligations risk criminal prosecution and 
must still pay their taxes, along with interest and civil penalties.”95 As 
a result, many individuals may respond to illustrations of such hefty 
consequences by believing that most tax penalties are significantly 
greater than they actually are. 
Beliefs About Government Efficacy. Last, by issuing press releases 
regarding criminal tax enforcement actions in the weeks before Tax 
Day, the government may convince taxpayers that it is always success-
ful when it challenges tax positions. 
When the government issues tax enforcement press releases, es-
pecially those involving criminal tax enforcement, it almost always 
publicizes instances in which it has prevailed. Not only does the gov-
ernment have the ability to choose which enforcement actions to pub-
licize, its success rate in criminal tax prosecutions is in excess of 90%.96 
 
 93 See id. 
 94 See id. 
 95 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, North Carolina Attorneys Plead Guilty 
to Failing to File Tax Returns (Apr. 6, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
tax/txdv05168.htm (quoting Eileen O’Connor, then-Assistant Att’y Gen. of the U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice Tax Div.). 
 96 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, TAX DIV., FY 2009 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET, TAX 
DIVISION 2 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2009justification/pdf/ 
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In addition, the government’s press releases frequently include state-
ments regarding its overwhelming success in combating abuse. For ex-
ample, on April 11, 2006, Eileen O’Connor, then-Assistant Attorney 
General of the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division, included the 
following language in the Division’s press release regarding specific 
tax enforcement actions: “The government has successfully prose-
cuted hundreds of tax cheats and promoters of abusive tax schemes; it 
has sought and obtained civil injunctions to stop the promotion of tax 
scams and the preparation of false and fraudulent tax returns.”97 
After reading the government’s tax enforcement press releases 
and their resulting coverage in the media, an individual taxpayer may 
become anchored to the impression that if the government detects 
and challenges an aggressive tax position, the government will win on 
the substantive legal merits. Decisions of the U.S. Tax Court, how-
ever, frequently demonstrate that the government also loses cases. 
Further, the Service’s Appeals Division often reverses the decisions of 
Service agents who have challenged various aspects of taxpayers’ tax 
returns.98 But as a result of the government’s tax enforcement press 
releases that highlight its victories using vivid and real examples, indi-
vidual taxpayers may be deterred from claiming tax positions that 
could have even a small chance of a challenge by a Service agent. 
3. Confidence 
By publicizing their tax enforcement efforts at the height of tax 
season, government officials may believe that they can influence not 
only the behavior of taxpayers who would otherwise be inclined to 
evade taxes, but also the behavior of taxpayers who are inclined to 
pay their tax liabilities correctly. 
Government officials have acknowledged that they use tax en-
forcement publicity as a way to bolster confidence among compliant 
taxpayers. When describing the government’s initiative to publicize its 
tax enforcement activities, Mark Matthews, then-Chief of the Ser-
vice’s Criminal Division, commented that “we learned that in order to 
enhance compliance . . . and to instill public confidence in the integrity 
                                                                                                                                       
fy09-tax.pdf (“The Tax Division’s success rate in its litigation — more than 90% — 
has an enormous effect on voluntary tax compliance.”). 
 97 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and IRS Highlight 
Tax Enforcement Efforts (Apr. 11, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/ 
txdv06212.htm (quoting Eileen O’Connor, then- Assistant Att’y Gen. of the U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice Tax Div.). 
 98 See David M. Fogel, The Inside Scoop About the IRS’s Appeals Division, 99 
TAX NOTES 1503, 1503 (Jun. 9, 2003). 
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of the tax system (reach those who believe that they pay the price for 
others who cheat), we needed to do a better job of publicizing our 
enforcement efforts.”99 Similarly, in discussing tax enforcement press 
releases issued by the U.S. Department of Justice, Eileen O’Connor, 
then-Assistant Attorney General for the Tax Division, commented in 
2007 that “[p]eople who pay what the law requires deserve the 
assurance that those who don’t, and those who promote or facilitate 
tax evasion, will not get away with it.”100 
The message underlying these statements is that government 
officials acknowledge that many taxpayers are willing to calculate and 
pay their taxes correctly, but that this willingness is conditional. As re-
ciprocity theory predicts, an individual will contribute toward a public 
good, but only on the condition that other individuals are doing so as 
well.101 Thus, this theory posits that many individuals will comply with 
the tax system as long as they believe that other taxpayers are also ful-
filling their tax obligations.102 But if individuals begin to perceive that 
tax cheating is rampant, they may reconsider their own tax compli-
ance. 
Government officials may view tax enforcement publicity as a 
way to affect important beliefs held by taxpayers who are motivated 
by feelings of reciprocity. We discuss some of these beliefs below. 
Beliefs About Government Detection. When the government pub-
licizes its successful prosecution of taxpayers who have committed tax 
fraud, it may cause compliant taxpayers to believe that the govern-
ment can detect abuse competently and efficiently, a belief that is im-
portant in light of reciprocity theory. Compliant taxpayers may as-
 
 99 Matthews, supra note 70, at 16. 
 100 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department and Internal Reve-
nue Service Highlight Tax Enforcement Results (Apr. 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv07216.htm (quoting Eileen O’Connor, then- Assistant 
Att’y Gen. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice Tax Div.); see also Internal Revenue Manual 
9.3.2.2., http://www.irs.gov/irm/part9/index.html, (last visited Feb. 19, 2010) 
(“Criminal Investigation serves the American public by investigating potential crimi-
nal violations of the Internal Revenue Code and related financial crimes in a manner 
that fosters confidence in the tax system and compliance with the law. One of the 
most effective methods to encourage compliance is through publicity of the activities 
that CI undertakes to enforce the laws within CI’s jurisdiction.”). 
 101 For discussion of reciprocity theory, see Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Recip-
rocity and Economics: The Economic Implications of Homo Reciprocans, 42 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 845 (1998); Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Is Equality Passé? Homo 
Reciprocans and the Future of Egalitarian Politics (1998), available at 
http://time.dufe.edu.cn/wencong/gintis/isinequa.pdf; Kahan, supra note 17. 
 102 See Kahan, supra note 17. 
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sume that the memorable examples of tax enforcement contained in 
government press releases and resulting news stories are indicative of 
the government’s ability to detect abuse. In turn, compliant taxpayers 
may assume that tax evasion is rare, given the odds of government de-
tection. While this assumption may be flawed,103 the availability heu-
ristic may cause compliant taxpayers to draw this conclusion at a time 
when they are in the process of preparing their annual individual tax 
returns. For this reason, one government official has commented that, 
in terms of the effect of tax enforcement publicity on compliant tax-
payers, “[it] helps keep the honest taxpayers honest.”104 
Beliefs About Punishment of Tax Cheats. The government’s press 
releases regarding criminal tax sanctions may also have reciprocity ef-
fects on compliant taxpayers. When the government announces that 
an individual who has promoted or pursued tax fraud has been sen-
tenced to months or years in prison, compliant taxpayers may perceive 
that the government punishes instances of free-riding in the tax sys-
tem harshly. They may make this assumption as a result of anchoring 
and the availability heuristic, just as individuals who would otherwise 
cheat are affected by these cognitive biases. Again, this assumption is 
incorrect, given that criminal tax sanctions are rare, and, in many 
cases, individuals pay no tax penalty at all. Nonetheless, vivid images 
in the weeks prior to Tax Day of celebrities or other prominent indi-
viduals marching off to federal prison may cause compliant taxpayers 
to assume, wrongly, that because tax penalties are so severe, few tax-
payers cheat. 
Beliefs About Identity of Tax Cheats. Last, the government’s tax 
enforcement publicity efforts prior to Tax Day may affect the beliefs 
of compliant taxpayers regarding the type of individuals who engage 
in tax avoidance and evasion strategies. 
The types of individual taxpayers whom the government high-
lights in its tax enforcement press releases are most likely not the typi-
cal peers of compliant taxpayers. Many of the cases that the govern-
ment chooses to publicize during this period often involve tax 
protesters, such as individuals who write “nunc pro tunc” (Latin for 
 
 103 As of 2007, the net federal tax gap was approximately $290 billion per year. 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP: A REPORT ON 
IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE 3 (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
pub/irs-news/tax_gap_report_final_080207_linked.pdf. Further, the tax noncompli-
ance rate among small business owners is in excess of 50%. Id. at 11. For further dis-
cussion of the components of the federal tax gap, see Morse, supra note 12. 
 104 Coder, supra note 76, at 740 (quoting Eileen Mayer, then-Chief of the Ser-
vice’s Criminal Division). 
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“now for then”) on their tax returns as a basis for not paying any in-
come tax liability,105 and tax fraud promoters, such as the founders of 
the “We The People Foundation”106 and the “Institute of Global 
Prosperity.”107 
Even though a compliant taxpayer’s peers may have participated 
in much more common forms of tax noncompliance, such as inflating 
tax basis or failing to report cash income, the government’s tax en-
forcement publicity efforts may foster a stereotype of tax cheating 
that is far more abusive than many forms of tax noncompliance. As a 
result of the “representativeness” bias, individuals often assume that 
one thing belongs to another group of things because it contains cer-
tain traits.108 When the government publicizes highly memorable im-
ages of tax protesters and tax fraud promoters, it may succeed in con-
vincing compliant taxpayers that their peers do not belong to the 
group of extreme outliers who cheat on their taxes. It sends the mes-
sage: “People like you” do not cheat, and therefore you shouldn’t ei-
ther. 
IV.  QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The principal finding of our study raises several important ques-
tions. The limited scope of this article, however, prevents us from fully 
addressing all of these questions. Below, we offer three questions that 
may be considered in depth in future research. 
A.  Should the Government Do This? 
An important question that our study prompts is whether, from a 
normative perspective, the government should engage in its apparent 
tax enforcement publicity strategy. We have suggested that govern-
ment officials issue more tax enforcement press releases at certain 
times of the year in order to deter taxpayers from cheating and to gain 
confidence from compliant taxpayers.109 Should the government use 
 
 105 See Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Announces “Dirty Dozen” 
Tax Scams for 2006 (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/ 
article/0,,id=154293,00.html. 
 106 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Irwin Schiff and Two Associates Indicted 
for Tax Fraud (Mar. 24, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv04182.htm. 
 107 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, “Global Prosperity” Principal Convicted 
of Tax Fraud (Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/tax/txdv05184.htm. 
 108 See TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN, supra note 78, at 4. 
 109 See supra notes 69–108 and accompanying text. 
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tax enforcement publicity in this manner? 
There are several potential arguments against the government’s 
publicity strategy. The following summarizes these arguments and of-
fers possible responses. 
Paltering. The first possible argument is that the government’s tax 
enforcement publicity strategy represents a form of deception. Freder-
ick Schauer and Richard Zeckhauser describe the government’s tim-
ing of press releases to encourage tax compliance as “paltering,”110 a 
term that literally means “acting insincerely or misleadingly.”111 As an 
example of paltering, the authors describe an advertising technique in 
which an advertiser sends a consumer an envelope that lacks a return 
address and is marked with a “government warning” about tampering 
with the mail.112 Schauer and Zeckhauser describe this act as paltering, 
because the advertiser “intentionally attempt[s] to create the misim-
pression that the envelope contains an official letter from a govern-
ment agency.”113 
Schauer and Zeckhauser also comment that the government en-
gages in paltering by issuing tax enforcement press releases immedi-
ately prior to Tax Day. The purpose of these announcements, the au-
thors note, is “to lead taxpayers to believe in a probability of audits 
and criminal prosecutions that is considerably higher than the actual 
objective probability of those occurrences.”114 They conclude their dis-
cussion of acts that they describe as paltering, including strategic tax 
enforcement publicity, by stating: 
[O]nce we understand paltering as involving the same intent 
as lying and the same effect as lying, and lacking only the ex-
act mechanism of literal falsehood, it is hard to understand 
why the law, except for the obvious problems of proof in-
volved, would be less concerned with paltering than lying.115 
 
 110 Schauer & Zeckhauser, supra note 36, at 39. 
 111 Id. at 44. Schauer and Zeckhauser distinguish paltering from lying. According 
to the authors, “[a] lie in its full glory . . . involves elements of intent, literal meaning, 
and effect.” Id. at 39. As a result, Schauer and Zeckhauser describe a liar as “someone 
who intentionally utters words that he or she knows to be false, where what is uttered 
is in fact literally false, and where utterance of the literally false words produces the 
effect of the listener believing or being likely to believe in the truth of something that 
is not in fact true.” Id. at 39. 
 112 Id. at 44. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 45. Schauer and Zeckhauser take the argument further by concluding 
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Thus, Schauer and Zeckhauser suggest that paltering in the tax en-
forcement context is at least questionable on moral grounds. 
Despite the power of Schauer and Zeckhauser’s rhetoric, it is not 
clear why the government’s use of tax enforcement publicity repre-
sents morally wrong behavior. The government does not appear to re-
veal misleading information to taxpayers while concealing contradic-
tory facts. The actions of the advertisers that Schauer and Zeckhauser 
describe seem distinguishable from the government’s tax enforcement 
press releases. When advertisers create the impression that an enve-
lope marked with a government warning is a piece of mail from the 
government, the consumer does not have access to any contradictory 
information without opening up the letter. On the other hand, even 
though the government may issue press releases in the days before 
Tax Day that describe criminal prosecutions, the data regarding the 
government’s tax enforcement capability, such as the overall 1.03% 
audit rate for individual taxpayers, is available to any individual tax-
payer with access to the Internet.116 
Paternalism. Another possible argument against the government’s 
publicity strategy is that it is paternalistic — that is, that the strategy is 
an instrument of coercion that restricts people’s freedom of choice.117 
One might argue that by causing taxpayers to believe that the likeli-
hood of a tax audit and the severity of a tax penalty are much higher 
than they are, the government acts in a paternalistic manner. 
While the government’s use of tax enforcement publicity may in-
fluence taxpayer decisions, its actions do not necessarily rise to the 
level of coercion. Some have described a government policy as pater-
nalistic if it intrudes upon people’s freedom of choice to the point that 
they do not actually have a choice.118 Government health insurance 
mandates are a better example of paternalism than the strategic use of 
information to affect perceptions.119 In the latter case, Richard Thaler 
and Cass Sunstein might even describe the government’s publicity 
strategy as an effort to “steer people’s choices in directions that will 
                                                                                                                                       
that “paltering is in some sense worse than lying.” Id. Their justification for this 
statement is that a palter is harder to detect than an outright lie. Id. Consequently, 
Schauer and Zeckhauser conclude that “if the harm of the palter is no less than the 
harm of the lie, then the very fact that it is safer to engage in one rather than another 
equally harmful act would suggest that it is the safer but equally harmful act — the 
palter — that is likely to become the greater social problem.” Id. 
 116 ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE RESULTS, supra note 31. 
 117 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 80, at 5. 
 118 See id. 
 119 See Francois Melese, Government-Mandated Benefits, Taxes, and Wages, 62 
SO. ECON. J. 53 (1995) for a discussion of government mandates and paternalism. 
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improve their lives.”120 For example, the publicity strategy may pre-
vent individual taxpayers from engaging in the specific types of risky, 
extreme tax offenses that are often the subject of the government’s 
publicity efforts, as well as less egregious tax offenses. In addition, 
even if one were to characterize the government’s publicity strategy as 
paternalistic, the subtle encouragement of people to be honest in filing 
their taxes can benefit society as a whole, thereby improving the lives 
of everyone. More generally, though, the charge of paternalism rings 
somewhat hollow in that tax evasion is illegal and thus is subject to 
coercion anyway. 
Undemocratic. A final possible argument against the govern-
ment’s publicity strategy is that it is inconsistent with basic tenets of 
democracy. One might argue that by distorting the perceptions of in-
dividual taxpayers, the government prevents these individuals from 
participating fully in the legislative and regulatory process. For exam-
ple, if tax enforcement publicity causes individuals to assume that the 
government is more effective at detecting abuse than it is in reality, 
these individuals may not support legislation that would increase 
funding for the Service or expand taxpayer disclosure of information 
requirements. A deliberate attempt to influence the beliefs of indi-
viduals through the use of strategically timed information may isolate 
these individuals from knowledge that is important to reform of the 
tax system. 
It is not clear whether the government’s publicity strategy has 
such an effect on individual taxpayers. Again, data regarding the gov-
ernment’s limited detection capability is already publicly available.121 
And government officials often complain publicly that the Service 
needs more funding in order to pursue its mission effectively.122 Fur-
ther, if the government did not engage in its tax enforcement publicity 
efforts, there is no reason to believe that the public would become 
more interested in issues of tax administration and enforcement than 
it is currently. 
This section is not meant to resolve any of these arguments 
against the government’s selective use of tax enforcement publicity; 
rather, each of these arguments raises questions that merit deeper 
consideration. 
 
 120 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 79, at 5. 
 121 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 122 Kahan, supra note 17, at 84–85 (“Usually timed to be reported on the media 
the week before personal income taxes are due, IRS-generated stories of the agency's 
own inefficacy in enforcing the law predictably generate resentment in those who rou-
tinely obey.”) 
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B.  How Does the Publicity Strategy Affect Taxpayers? 
Another significant question that our analysis leaves unanswered 
is whether the government’s tax enforcement publicity strategy has its 
apparent intended effect on individual taxpayers. Put differently, are 
individuals actually more inclined to comply with the tax system as a 
result of the government’s publicity efforts? 
Other research suggests that the answer to this question is yes. 
One empirical study shows that the government’s criminal tax fraud 
convictions have a “highly significant and positive impact on income 
reporting, and an equally significant, but smaller, positive impact on 
offsets reporting.”123 Another study confirms this result and finds that 
“the significant magnitude of general deterrence [results] implies that 
media play a large role in fostering tax compliance.”124 Further, ac-
cording to an annual study of taxpayer attitudes conducted by the 
Service’s Oversight Board, in 2008, nearly 60% of individual taxpayers 
reported that “fear of an audit” had an effect on their decision to pay 
their taxes honestly.125 This number appears to be especially high, 
given that for many taxpayers, such as wage earners, there is a nearly 
99% chance that an individual taxpayer will not be subject to an au-
dit.126 
The effect of the government’s issuance of tax enforcement press 
releases on individual taxpayers depends on the extent to which the 
media publicizes the information in these press releases. Our study 
does not track the number of instances in which the media reported 
on tax enforcement actions described in the press releases in our sam-
ple. There is reason to believe, however, that many of the press re-
leases in our sample were subsequently publicized through national 
and local media sources. First, the media — and the public itself — 
may be especially attracted to tax-related stories in the weeks leading 
up to Tax Day, given the salience of paying taxes during that period. 
Second, the government strives to make news reporters aware of its 
tax enforcement press releases. According to a 2007 statement of the 
then-Chief of the Service’s Criminal Investigation Division, the gov-
ernment has assigned experienced public information officers to serve 
as “the local media contact to provide public record information to 
 
 123 Plumley, supra note 21, at 36. 
 124 Dubin, supra note 30, at 502. 
 125 IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD, 2008 TAXPAYER ATTITUDE SURVEY 5 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.ustreas.gov/irsob/reports/2009/IRSOB_2008-TAS.pdf. 
 126 ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE RESULTS, supra note 31. 
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the media about the field office’s cases.”127 The official further re-
ported that between 2000 and 2007, the “publicity rate” on sentenced 
criminal tax enforcement cases grew from 54% to 78.1%.128 
Future research should address the extent to which the media dis-
seminates the information contained in the government’s tax en-
forcement press releases to the general public. 
C.  What Are the Risks? 
Finally, our study raises the question of whether there are risks 
inherent in the government’s tax enforcement publicity strategy. 
One possible risk is that the government’s tax enforcement pub-
licity may over-deter individual taxpayers. Taxpayers who have an ex-
aggerated fear of a Service challenge or of tax penalties, perhaps as a 
result of tax enforcement publicity, may claim tax positions that are 
not in their best financial interest but that may enable them to face the 
lowest chance of an audit. For example, some taxpayers choose to 
claim the standard deduction rather than itemize their deductions in 
order to minimize the chance that the Service will audit their tax re-
turns.129 Other taxpayers may fail to seek tax refunds to which they are 
entitled.130 In either case, the government’s use of tax enforcement 
publicity in the weeks prior to Tax Day may have unintended effects 
on taxpayer behavior; how much is an open question. 
The government’s publicity strategy may also cause individual 
taxpayers to assume that “cheating” in the tax context only refers to 
extreme acts of tax evasion. The stream of news reports in the weeks 
prior to Tax Day regarding tax fraud cases may lead individual tax-
payers to conclude that the government only detects and challenges 
tax returns that rely on tax-protester arguments or other abusive tax 
positions, rather than tax returns that reflect far more common forms 
of tax noncompliance, such as an inflated tax basis or unsubstantiated 
business deductions. In the words of the late Sen. Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan, the government’s use of tax enforcement publicity may 
 
 127 Coder, supra note 76, at 740 (quoting Eileen Mayer, then-Chief of the Ser-
vice’s Criminal Division). 
 128 Id. 
 129 See I.R.S. Pub. 501, Exemptions, Standard Deduction, and Filing Information, 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p501/index.html (last visited May 14, 2010). 
 130 See, e.g., Press Release, Internal Revenue Serv., IRS Has $1.2 Billion for Peo-
ple Who Have Not Filed a 2004 Tax Return (Mar. 19, 2008), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=180280,00.html. 
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“define deviancy down.”131 
Last, it is possible that the tax enforcement press releases could 
create a backlash against the government. If the government appears 
to issue too many press releases describing criminal sanctions, indi-
vidual taxpayers may begin to view the Service as overly aggressive.132 
This effect could become especially pronounced if the subject of these 
press releases is a popular celebrity, public figure, or someone whose 
situation arouses sympathy.133 For other taxpayers, those who appear 
to have an automatic, though unfounded, adverse reaction to any gov-
ernment action involving the Service, the issuance of tax enforcement 
press releases in the days prior to Tax Day could serve to fuel hatred 
of the agency.134 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This article answers the question of when the government publi-
cizes tax enforcement and offers explanations for the answer. 
The principal finding of our study is that, from 2003 through 2009, 
the government issued a disproportionately large number of tax en-
forcement press releases during the weeks leading up to Tax Day 
compared to the rest of the year. Specifically, we found that on an av-
erage weekly basis, the U.S. Department of Justice Tax Division is-
sued: (a) 58% more tax enforcement press releases from February 1 
through Tax Day than it issued during the rest of the year; (b) 71% 
more tax enforcement press releases from March 1 through Tax Day 
than it issued during the rest of the year; and (c) 128% more tax en-
forcement press releases from April 1 through Tax Day than it issued 
 
 131 Andrew Karmen, “Defining Deviancy Down”: How Senator Moynihan’s Mis-
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ture, 2 J. OF CRIM. JUST. AND POPULAR CULTURE 99, 99–100 (1994). 
 132 See Raskolnikov, supra note 12, at 708 (commenting that too much tax en-
forcement publicity “raises the specter of an oppressive tax collector dead set on in-
tervening in personal affairs of law-abiding citizens”). 
 133 Lederman, supra note 12, at 1493, n.219 (commenting that “Willie Nelson was 
the object of sympathy for his tax troubles”). 
 134 The Service has reported that as Tax Day approaches, angry threats against its 
agents and officers increase. See Martin Vaughan, Threats Against IRS Employees On 
The Rise — Official, WALL ST. J. BUSINESS NEWS, Feb. 19, 2010. For example, on Feb-
ruary 19, 2010, Andrew Joseph Stack, a disgruntled taxpayer, deliberately flew his 
private plane into an office building that housed Service workers in Austin, Texas, 
killing himself and one Service employee and injuring over a dozen other individuals. 
See id. 
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during the rest of the year.135 Each of these differences is highly statis-
tically significant.136 
We offer two explanations for the timing patterns that we ob-
served. First, government officials may issue so many tax enforcement 
press releases in the weeks prior to Tax Day in order to deter tax non-
compliance by causing some taxpayers to conclude that the probabil-
ity of an audit and the severity of a penalty for tax noncompliance are 
greater than they actually are.137 Second, government officials may use 
strategically timed tax enforcement publicity to increase confidence 
among compliant taxpayers that the government effectively detects 
and punishes tax cheats.138 
Our study raises several important questions regarding the gov-
ernment’s tax enforcement publicity strategy, including its normative 
appropriateness, its actual effect on individual taxpayer behavior, and 
its potential risks.139 We leave these questions for future research. 
 
 135 See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
 136 See id. 
 137 See supra notes 69–98 and accompanying text. 
 138 See supra notes 99–108 and accompanying text. 
 139 See supra Part IV. 
